Climate change and the problem of moral responsibility.
A careful reading of the Synthesis Report of the March 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (Richardson et al: 2009) that involved 2500 professional participants, most of them climate science researchers, leads one to the conclusion that, because climate change can be prevented, inaction is inexcusable. This in fact is the title of one of the key messages to the conference and could be seen as the moral imperative of the Synthesis Report: “Inaction is inexcusable.”
A careful reading of the Synthesis Report of the March 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (Richardson et al: 2009) that involved 2500 professional participants, most of them climate science researchers, leads one to the conclusion that, because climate change can be prevented, inaction is inexcusable. This in fact is the title of one of the key messages to the conference and could be seen as the moral imperative of the Synthesis Report: “Inaction is inexcusable.”
Table of contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Summary of Synthesis Report from Climate Change
1.1.1.
Climatic trends
1.1.2.
Social and Environmental Disruption
1.1.3.
Long term Strategy: global targets and deadline
1.1.4.
Equity Dimension
1.1.5.
Inaction is inexcusable
1.1.6. Meeting the challenge
2. Questions that
are asked with regard to climate change
2.1. Is it too late?
2.2. Is climate change really a problem?
2.3. Is climate change just another unavoidable case of extinction?
3. Developing a
climate ethic
3.1. What can we do now and what do we owe future generations?
3.2. The Precautionary Principle
3.2.1. Some threats of
harm and unacceptable outcomes in South Africa
3.3. Does ethics have a role to play in the face of climate change?
3.4. Mitigation measures
3.5. Who should make the most serious commitment to curbing G.H.G.
emissions?
4. Eco-feminism
and a climate change ethic.
5. Conclusion
6. Bibliography
7. Declaration
1. Introduction
A careful reading
of the Synthesis Report of the March 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference
(Richardson et al: 2009) that involved 2500 professional participants, most of
them climate science researchers, leads one to the conclusion that, because
climate change can be prevented, inaction is inexcusable. This in fact is the
title of one of the key messages to the conference and could be seen as the
moral imperative of the Synthesis Report: “Inaction is inexcusable.”
In this essay I
will outline some of the serious impacts that climate change will have within
the lifetime of most of those alive today with even stronger effects on future
generations and examine the problem of the moral responsibility of the current
generation towards future generations. While I will argue in favour of
mitigating and adaptive changes as part of our moral obligation to future
generations, my main argument will be for the recognition of climate change as
a fundamentally ethical issue requiring the development of a “climate ethics”.
I will suggest that the link which eco-feminism sees between dominations of
women and dominations of nature is one which can help us, particularly in the
South African context of our experience of overcoming dominations of different
groups over each other, to develop an ethics of environmental care as our gift
to future generations.
1.1. Summary of
Synthesis Report from Climate Change (Richardson et al: 2009)
The Synthesis Report
contains some of the most up-to-date information on climate change and was
presented in six key areas that are briefly summarised as follows:
1.1.1. Climatic trends – the Report
details amongst other things the remorseless increasing in past decades in sea
level; Greenland melt area; Greenland ice mass loss; surface air
temperature; ocean
heat content; atmospheric CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and total
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in CO2-equivalent.
1.1.2. Social and environmental disruption – the Report details actual climate disruption realities that have
already happened such as (a) increased hurricane intensity, drought, fires and
flooding and impacts on tropical diseases, agriculture, malnutrition, and
health in general; (b) major ecosystem damage including dieback of Amazon
rainforest and Sahara greening; (c) huge
decrease in ocean pH (increased acidity) in the last two centuries that is
unprecedented over the last 20 million years and with devastating consequences
for coral and crustaceans; (d) increased species extinction rates 1,000 times
that of background rates typical of the planet’s history; and (e) huge
increased risks in relations to species, extreme weather events, global
distribution of impacts, aggregate impacts and risk of large scale
discontinuities.
1.1.3. Long term strategy: global targets and deadline – “rapid, sustained, and effective mitigation based on coordinated
global and regional action is required to avoid “dangerous climate change”
regardless of how it is defined” (2009:6).
1.1.4. Equity dimension – “climate
change is having, and will have, strongly differential effects on people within
and between countries and regions, on this generation and future generations,
and on human societies and the natural world ... tackling climate change should
be seen as integral to the broader goals of enhancing socio-economic
development and equity throughout the world”(2009:6).
1.1.5. Inaction is inexcusable –
“Society already has many tools and approaches – economic, technological,
behavioural, and managerial – to deal effectively with the climate change
challenge. If these tools are not widely and vigorously implemented, adaptation
to the unavoidable climate change and the social transformation required to
decarbonise economies will not be achieved. A wide range of benefits will flow
from a concerted effort to achieve effective and rapid adaptation and
mitigation. These include job growth in the sustainable sector; reductions in
the health, social, economic and environmental costs of climate change; and the
repair of ecosystems and revitalisation of ecosystem services" (2009:6).
1.1.6. Meeting the challenge - the key
final conclusion was ultimately one about human values and the enormous risk we
face: "Ultimately these human dimensions of climate change [the cultures
and worldviews of individuals and communities] will determine whether humanity
eventually achieves the great transformation that is in sight at the beginning
of the 21st century or whether humanity ends the century with a "miserable
existence in a +5 degree Celsius world" (2009:34).
There is a sense
in which the synthesis report makes for very grim reading. The authors suggest
that the scientific evidence overwhelmingly indicates that allowing the
emission of greenhouse gases from human activities to continue unchecked
constitutes a “significant threat to the well-being and continued development
of contemporary society” (2009:7).
2. Questions that are asked with regard to climate change
2.1. Is it too late?
Anthony Weston
(1999:43) poses the question “is it too late?” Although written 10 years before
the synthesis report the issues he raises are as pertinent as ever, because the
situation has deteriorated in that period. In the face of global warming and
its threat of coastal inundation, super hurricanes and drastic and
unpredictable climate changes, he speaks of “ hidden dangers, risk multipliers,
processes that intensify other processes: global warming may speed up the
decomposition of the dead organic matter, for example, that now lies on forest
floors, flooding the atmosphere with vast new quantities of carbon dioxide and
accelerating further warming” (1999:46) and says that it is no wonder that many
feel that we are in a kind of “endgame”
and that it is already too late to effect change.
Al Gore (2006:305)
likewise admits that it's easy to feel overwhelmed and powerless when
considering a problem as vast as global warming and to be sceptical that
individual efforts can really have an impact. He insists we should resist a
sceptical response because the crisis will only be resolved if we take
individual responsibility for it. He then gives a number of very practical ways
whereby individuals can make a difference, including reducing emissions from
home energy use; choosing energy-efficient lighting and appliances; and
operating and maintaining appliances properly; insulating one's home;
conserving hot water; reduce driving and driving smarter; recycling, etc. I
suggest that as individuals, we owe future generations these commitments on our
part in the present.
Perhaps his
biggest contribution in the context of this essay is his call to “be a catalyst
for change” (2006:318). It is a call to learn more about the state of the
environment and informing and inspiring others to action; a call to voice
support and disapproval through the ballot box; and to use purchasing and
investing power to show support or intolerance of corporations and outlets. I
will suggest later that eco-feminism can give many guidelines in developing a ‘climate
ethic’ but mention here ecofeminism’s commitment to link theory with political
activism, because Al Gore's call is likewise a call to political activism.
Climate change can be prevented, but
it has to become a societal issue through activism in order for changes to
be effective.
Alongside Al
Gore's optimism we can place Anthony Weston’s answer to his own question: “is
it too late?” His answer can perhaps be summarised as an optimistic “perhaps
not.” He sees in our very waking up to the problem of global warming a sign of
progress (1999:47). He senses a hopeful sign in the fact that the list of past
and possible cataclysms no longer comes as a surprise. He believes that no
problem will be solved without an awareness that it is a problem (but is
definitely not so naive as to suggest that because we have identified the
problem, we will therefore solve it). He sees hope in the fact that while 30
years ago (40 now) the USA
An equal sign of
hope would no doubt be our own country’s (South Africa’s) Constitution[1] which
includes the following clauses: “everyone has the right to have the environment
protected for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable
legislative and other measures” in Section 24 (b) (ii) and section 24 (b) (iii)
which refers to “justifiable economic and social development and ecologically
sustainable development.” While the vagueness and anthropocentrism of the
environmental clauses in our Constitution can be criticised, the presence of
such clauses lays the groundwork for the activism referred to earlier and to be
discussed in more detail later. Furthermore their presence indicates in the
very least, a positive awareness of the environmental problems facing us.
2.2. Is climate change really a problem?
There are many,
both scientists and lay people, who do not recognise or acknowledge that global
warming is a problem and the development of a climate ethic must take this into
consideration and even be designed in a way that brings sceptics and naysayers
on board in any case.
The online
Wikipedia (Wikipedia: 2010) has a “List of scientists opposing the mainstream
scientific assessment of global warming.”
This article lists nearly 50 living and 4
deceased scientists from leading universities and institutes around the world
who have made statements that conflict with the mainstream assessment of global
warming as summarized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and other scientific bodies. By its own
admission it is an incomplete list. Under the following headings it lists
scientists who dissent in the following ways:
I include one such entry from Wikipedia
(2010) in order to show the type of information which is easily accessible to
the sceptics and nay-sayers:
“John Christy, professor
of atmospheric science and director of the Earth System Science Centre at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, contributor to
several IPCC reports: "I'm sure the majority (but not
all) of my IPCC colleagues cringe when I say this, but I see neither the
developing catastrophe nor the smoking gun proving that human activity is to
blame for most of the warming we see. Rather, I see a reliance on climate
models (useful but never "proof") and the coincidence that changes in
carbon dioxide and global temperatures have loose similarity over time.”
Not only does a
climate ethic need to recognise and try to take on board ‘denialist’ scientists
and the public who are influenced by them, it also needs to win over a public
who have “heard it all before”. Weston (1999:50) reminds us that in the 1960s
we were told, on the best of evidence, “that 1 billion or more people would
starve to death by 1990, because populations had irrevocably outgrown food
supplies. Since then, population growth has slowed down while food supplies have
increased and although widespread starvation and malnutrition exist, they are
arguably the result of political causes, not primarily population explosion. He
says “the ‘population bomb’ didn't go off yet we were told that it was “too
late.” It wasn't. Do we know it is too late now?”
2.3. Is climate change just another unavoidable cause of extinction?
A climate ethic
needs to take on board, or at least bear in mind, those who fully accept the
reality of climate change, but see it as just another unavoidable cause of
extinction in the history of our planet, which has gone through several
environmental crises which have led to mass extinctions.
Martin Spence
(2001:105) discusses the unspoken assumption that the degradation or
destruction of the environment is a relatively recent phenomenon, associated
with the rise of industrial society or capitalism. This unspoken assumption
often goes hand in hand with a vague notion that at some earlier point in history
people tended to live “in harmony with nature.” He calls these “comforting
myths” and goes on to cite authors who have published articles which have laid
much emphasis on patterns of environmental degradation and crisis triggered by
precapitalist and non-capitalist social formations such as the New World
empires of the Maya and Inca, as well as in the Roman Empire and feudal Europe .
Acknowledging that
these examples only go back 3000 years, he identifies the need for a
comprehensive view of the relationship between human society and the natural
environment which encompasses the experience of the non-urban, non-literate
societies of the Stone Age. He cites authors who have published regarding the “well-established
and academically respectable view that Stone Age humans were directly
responsible for wiping out hundreds of species of large mammals and mega fauna
in Australia and America
Spence concludes
that Stone Age hunter gatherers did not live in timeless harmony with nature,
but instead were capable of exerting a dramatic and occasionally catastrophic
impact upon the natural environment. “In acknowledging this, we acknowledge our
common humanity with them - which includes a common ignorance in the face of
nature, and a shared inability to predict the consequences of our own human
actions” (2001:117)
3. Developing a Climate Ethic
A climate ethic thus
needs to take on board not only those who see and accept climate change as an
avoidable occurrence and feel a moral responsibility to try and mitigate and
adapt for it, it also needs to at least attempt to take on board naysaying
scientists and a sceptical public who’ve heard it all before and don't believe it,
or who see catastrophic climate change as an inevitability; and it needs to do
this for a people who, according to David Ehrenfeld (1981:243) have developed a “mechanism
that can be called the avoidance of unpleasant
reality” and another which he calls “the ignorance of the causes of problem.”
Both of these mechanisms that he postulates are quite self explanatory in the
context of this essay thus far. He suggests (1981:269) that nothing in his
century (20th) is free from the taint of human arrogance and that we have “defiled
everything, much of it for ever.” He further quite correctly suggests that it is
time to look at the direction in which our civilisation appears to be moving,
and to discuss the possibilities for making appropriate responses to our
present circumstances. This surely describes the task of a climate ethic in a
society still driven by humanism but “by the time the machinery of humanism has
broken down sufficiently so that it is no longer capable of doing widespread
destruction, how much will be left of what we value?” (1981:258).
Hopefully an
effective climate ethic can be developed before this point is reached.
3.1. What can we do now and what do we owe future generations?
Acknowledging that
in any given population there will be those who see climate change as avoidable,
those who see it as unavoidable, those who don't see it as a problem at all and
those who really don't care one way or another, we need to develop an ethic
which has as an unashamed desired outcome the tackling of climate change as an
avoidable phenomenon but which at the same time promotes a care for the
environment regardless of whether that care affects climate or not. Anthony
Weston (1999:585) suggests that maybe the earth doesn't need our saving but
that regardless of that, we need to live as co-inhabitants with the environment
of this planet because we are part of nature. We thus need to stop what
destruction we can while not necessarily feeling the need to save the earth, but rather to join the Earth.
I would suggest
therefore that we need to explore and put in place both mitigating and adaptive
policies which encourage “joining the earth” while at the same time developing
and promoting a climate ethic.
Stephen Gardiner
(2004:555) laments the fact that few moral philosophers have written on climate
change. He correctly finds this strange in the face of the fact that many
politicians and policymakers claim that climate change is not only the most
serious environmental problem facing the world, but also one of the most
important international problems per se.
Citing a number of scholars, he goes on to point out that many of those working
in other disciplines describe climate change as fundamentally an ethical issue. (Writing later he calls climate
ethics an “emerging field” (2006:1)). Drawing on the work of Dale Jamieson,
Gardiner (2004:575) suggests that our existing values are insufficient to the
task of dealing with climate change for the following reasons: firstly, our
present values evolved relatively recently in low population density and low
technology societies with seemingly unlimited access to land and other
resources; secondly, these values include as a central component an account of
responsibility which presupposes that harms and their causes are individual,
that they can be readily identified and that they are local in time and space;
and finally he argues that problems such as climate change fit none of these
criteria. Thus a new value system is needed.
In the context of
this essay, I suggest that we owe future generations the “gift” or development
of this value system.
3.2. The Precautionary principle
Jensen (2002:39 ff) discusses the “precautionary
principle” and points out that it is becoming popular in law and politics. The
precautionary principle when applied to an issue like climate change suggests
that when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.
Gardiner (2004:577) suggests that a
reasonable case can be made that climate change satisfies the conditions for
the core precautionary principle because many of the predicted outcomes from
climate change seem severe, and some are catastrophic. Hence there are grounds
for saying there are threats of harm with unacceptable outcomes.
3.2.1.
Some threats of harm and unacceptable outcomes in South Africa
While some “unacceptable outcomes”
were covered above in the summary of the Synthesis Report, I would like to look
at some in a little more detail which are closer to home here in South Africa
Fauchereau et al (2003:139) claim
that Southern Africa 's geographic location,
contrasted oceanic surroundings and atmospheric dynamics are all conducive to
extreme weather events and great interannual variability of the hydrological
cycle. Since the major part of Southern Africa
suffers from poor infrastructure and low socio-economic development, the consequences
of extreme weather or climate anomalies are often devastating to both people
and property. By looking at the recorded data and comparing that with
projections based on global atmospheric models they draw the conclusion that
while there does not seem to be a trend towards drier or moister conditions
during the last century, rainfall variability
has experienced significant modifications, especially in recent decades, with
interannual variability increasing since the late 1960s. In particular, droughts
have become more intense and widespread. Their study indicates that these
changes could be related to long-term variations in the '
Sea-Surface-Temperature ' background which is part of the recognised global
warming signal.
Thomas et al (2004:145) point out
that climate change over the past 30 years has produced numerous shifts in the
distributions and abundances of species and has been implicated in one species
level extinction. Using projections of species distributions for future climate
scenarios they assess extinction risks for sample regions. For South Africa
While admitting that many unknowns
remain in projecting extinctions they conclude that their analysis establishes “that
anthropogenic climate warming at least ranks alongside other recognised threats
to global diversity. Contrary to previous projections it is likely to be the
greatest threat in many if not most regions. The ability of species to reach
new climatically suitable areas will be hampered by habitat loss and
fragmentation, and their ability to persist in appropriate climates is likely
to be affected by new invasive species” (2004:148).
Pim Martens (1999:536) discusses the
effect of climate change on the spread of various diseases. Malaria, a scourge
on our continent, is identified as one that will not only become more prevalent
in Africa as temperatures and humidities rise in places where the mosquito
could previously not thrive, but will also re-manifest itself (and already has)
in areas like those that surround the Mediterranean
as the climate becomes warmer and more humid. In a similar vein, McMichael et
al (2006:864) point out that many infectious agents, vector organisms, nonhuman
reservoir species, and rate of pathogen replication are sensitive to climatic
conditions. “In regions where low temperature, lower rainfall, or absence of vector
habitat restrict transmission of vector borne disease, climatic changes could
tip the ecological balance and trigger in epidemics.” They go on to show how
epidemics could also result from climate related migration of reservoir hosts
or human populations.
3.3. Does ethics have a role
to play in the face of climate change?
Stephen Gardiner (2006:398) suggests
that if we do not think that our own actions are open to moral assessment, or
that various interests (our own, those of our country, those of distant people,
future people, animals and nature) matter then it is hard to see why climate
change poses a problem. But of course these things do matter, and once we see
this, “then we appear to need some account of moral responsibility, morally
important interests and what to do about both. And this puts us squarely in the
domain of ethics.”
Thus it seems obvious that ethical
decisions are fundamental to the main policy decisions that must be made. These
decisions include where to set a ceiling for global greenhouse gas emissions
and how to distribute the emissions allowed by such a ceiling. These decisions
in turn are guided by how the interests of the current generation are weighed
against those of future generations, together with decisions regarding the
importance of historical responsibility for the problem and the current needs
and future aspirations of particular societies.
3.4. Mitigation measures
For those who acknowledge and accept
that global warming and associated climate change is anthropogenic and can
be prevented, mitigation measures are surely our first duty to future
generations. Chandler et al (2002:37) point out that compared to other
developing countries South
Africa South
Africa
From what I said earlier regarding
weather patterns and possible extinctions, South Africa
Winkler (2010:73-142) outlines
various mitigation options for South
Africa
Our nation is faced with two
scenarios - growth without constraints
where we pursue a development path as if they were no carbon constraint, or the
required by science scenario, where
the full implications of what the science of climate change is telling us, is
incorporated into our development plans. The gap between these two scenarios is
huge but our nation seems to be aware of its duty to future generations, as can
be seen in these words by (then) President Kgalema Motlanthe: “Government has
agreed to a strategic policy framework for our emissions to peak between 2020
and 2025, and then stabilise for a decade, before declining in absolute terms
towards mid century” (in Winkler 2010:205).
3.5. Who should make the most serious commitment to curbing GHG emissions?
Our nation's commitment to control
and eventually cut down on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is commendable, particularly from a developing
nation as ours, but there are many who believe that it is the developed nations
which need to make the most serious commitment to curbing GHG emissions,
especially as they have contributed most to the problem in the first place.
Henry Shue (2001:453) likens the situation to that of a picnic which has been
prepared for 12 people. Some arrive early and eat enough for two or three
people. The last two or three people to arrive have nothing to eat because the
early comers have eaten their share.
The early comers have deprived the later arrivals of their share and thus
harmed them. Furthermore, unless the first comers can “make some heroically
implausible assumption” that the late comers don't have a right to be there or that
the early comers somehow had a right to double the share of the others, then
they have injured them severely and need in some way to make restitution.
The following paragraphs are a
summary of Shue's ethical suggestions regarding who should cut down on GHG
emissions and who should be allowed to increase GHG emissions. He suggests that
just as any individual needs a minimum amount of essential resources like safe
water and safe air, so too do people need what amounts to a minimum amount of
the planet's capacity to deal safely with GHG emissions. This is because the
vast majority of people alive today must, in order to survive, engage in
economic activities that generate GHG emissions. The absorptive capacity for
GHG emissions thus needs to be seen not only as a vital resource but as an
increasingly scarce one. The situation, however, is reversible.
If/when our economies become based
on solar, wind and/or geothermal energy that produces no GHG, this absorptive
capacity will no longer be a vital
resource. For now, however, it is and will remain for some time, a vital
resource. Wealthy and developed countries have the capacity to develop
alternative energy sources and to cut
down on frivolously consumed energy. The poorest human beings need to engage in
economic activities which, given that the current world economy runs on GHG
producing fossil fuel, add GHG emissions to the earth's atmosphere. Going back
to the picnic scenario, the affluent societies have deprived the poor of their ‘share’
of the planet's capacity to absorb GHG emissions.
Shue suggests the following in order
to overcome this injustice: (1) in the forums where GHG emission quotas are “bargained”
over, the bargainers with leverage (i.e. wealthy developed nations) need to
take stands on principle on behalf of the weak - current and future in order to
produce fair outcomes; then (2) there needs to be fair distribution of
allocations of emissions that guarantee the availability of the minimum
necessary emissions to every person; and finally, (3) because in the short term
it will be expensive to take the measures necessary to reduce total global GHG
emissions, the greatest costs will have to be borne by the states whose current
emissions most exceed their allocation according to the point 2.
4.Eco-feminism and a climate change ethic
For all the aforegoing to happen we
need to develop an ethic that really cares
for the environment, an ethic that will be attractive whether or not one
believes or cares that the earth is threatened by climate change. I want to
suggest that eco-feminism provides the basis for such an ethic. We need to work
towards a society that respects the environment. Sterba(2001:240) reminds us
that when looking at societies, which are always human creations, we need to
ask not only what does society do for
people but also what any particular society does to people. The truth is many social structures serve to oppress
some members of society for the benefit of others. This oppressive social
structure in turn, works to reinforce a way of thinking and living that
encourages domination in all forms, including domination of the natural world.
There are a variety of eco-feminist
positions and I mentioned earlier that most of them link theory with political
activism and identified that as a strength in the cause of environmentalism. Now
I wish to highlight another area of commonality in eco-feminism and that is
that eco-feminists agree that there is a link between dominations of women and
dominations of nature and that an understanding of one is crucial to
understanding the other.
Victoria Davion (2001:234) discusses
the feminist view that “the shift in worldviews from the organic to the
mechanistic was a major vehicle for the devaluation of both women and nature.”
The shift from an earth-centred to a sun-centred worldview entailed a shift
from earth as nurturing mother at the centre of the universe to the sun as
conquering and subduing male at the centre of the universe, where nature had to
be subdued and controlled. This led to the development of a “logic of
domination” which uses premises about differences between entities and asserts
that such differences constitute the moral superiority of one group and that
being superior entitles members of the superior group to subordinate members of
the inferior group. Davion (2001:235) quotes Karen Warren (1990) saying that a
typical form of such arguments is as follows:
(A1) Humans do, plants do not, have the capacity
to consciously change the community in which they live.
(A2)
Whatever has this capacity is morally superior to whatever does not have it.
(A3) Humans are morally superior to plants
and rocks.
(A4) For any X and Y, if X is
morally superior to Y, then X is morally justified in Subordinating Y.
(A5) Humans are morally justified in
subordinating plants and rocks
(B1) Women are identified with
nature and the realm of the physical; men are identified with the “human” and
the realm of the mental.
(B2)Whatever is identified with
nature and the realm of the physical is inferior to (“below”) whatever is
identified with the “human” and the realm of the mental;
(B3) Thus, women are inferior to
men.
(B4) For any X and Y, if X is
superior to Y then X is justified in subordinating Y.
(B5) Men are justified in subordinating woman.
The fact that domination of nature
by humans and the sexist domination of women by men, rely on the same general
framework and the fact that the devaluation of women depends on the prior
devaluation of nature means projects to end sexism and the exploitation of
nature are conceptually linked.
Davion suggests that “environmentalists
and feminists should be allies” (2001:236). She goes on to argue that if one
grants conceptual links between the domination of nature and the domination of
women, and I agree with the argument that those links are strong and
demonstrable, then it follows that “a movement that is not feminist will yield
at best a superficial understanding of the domination of nature. Those fighting
to save the environment should, as a matter of consistency be working to
overthrow patriarchy, and those working to overthrow patriarchy should be
fighting to save the environment” (2001:236).
This brings me to the final
contribution that I believe eco-feminism can make and that is in the area of
the development of an ethics of care.
Des Jardins points out that in
recent decades several feminists have brought many of the values traditionally
associated with women's roles into the forefront of ethical theorizing. This ethics of care seeks to articulate and
defend a perspective that de-emphasises
abstract rules and principles in favour of a contextualised ethics focusing on
caring and relationships. “An ethics of care begins with a moral universe in
which co-operation replaces conflict, relationships replace confrontation and caring
for others replaces rights and duties” (Des Jardins 1993: 252).
Regarding our duties to future
generations, an ethics of care can shift our focus away from abstract questions
and start from the lived experience that many people do, in fact, care about
what happens to future people, and what happens to our planet in the future.
Instead of getting bogged down in questions regarding the moral standing of
animals or ecosystems it asks questions like “do we care about animals? Do we
have a relationship to the environment?”
I believe that raising the issues
and pursuing them in the way ecofeminism suggests is a solid way forward in
developing an environmental or climate ethic.
5. Conclusion
In this essay I have identified the
reality of anthropogenic climate change while acknowledging that there are
those who don't see climate change as a preventable or changeable phenomenon. I
have suggested that we have a duty to future generations to embrace mitigating
and adaptive measures but our greatest duty is surely to develop an ethic which
promotes a responsibility to care deeply for the environment and its long-term
well-being. I have suggested that eco-feminism provides the necessary building
blocks for the development of such an ethic.
6. Bibliography
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