Children Ought to Be Produced for Their Own Sake, Not to Satisfy Our Desires
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The
Naturalistic Fallacy Thesis
3. What does it
mean to produce children “for their own sake”?
4. Why do we have
children?
5. Changes in
demand for children and how they can be explained
6. Is It Moral to
Produce Children?
7. Conclusion
8. List of
References
9. Declaration
1.Introduction
Every moment of
the day, in every part of the world, children are born. Some of them are
greatly desired, some are seen as a gift from a deity, others are viewed as
accidents and are scarcely welcomed. The motivations for pregnancy are many and
because the motivation for having a child may affect a child's development and
the total family, it is an important consideration. To create a new human being
and then to guide that baby, then child, then adolescent in a way that allows
him or her to develop his or her own best self, are deeply satisfying
experiences. In the 21st century, birth control is widely available. This
permits a woman to consciously override her ovaries and choose when, or if, she
will bear children. Ultrasound and amniocentesis enable women to spend decades
in a career and still look forward to bearing a healthy infant. In some parts
of the world, notably those where liberalism is the order of the day, adults
are free to devise and implement their own life plans, including the freedom to
form and raise a family according to their own conception of the good. In other
parts of the world, tribal and social norms influence the bringing into the
world and raising of children. Where ever children born, however, the child’s
needs create parental duties. Pre-eminent woman scientist Anke Ehrhardt is
described by Sarah Hrdy (1999:407) as a woman “every bit as impressive for her
warmth and grace as for the accomplishments that made the world's expert on
children's development of gender identity.” Hrdy describes how over breakfast
at a scientific conference in Prague
It is with the
above in mind that I intend to present an ethical reflection on the statement: children ought to be produced for their own
sake, not to satisfy our desires.
In discussing
critical reasoning, Chris Swoyer (2002:7) says that good or cogent reasoning is reasoning that is
based on reasons or evidence rather than on rash appeals to emotion. It should
be arrived at by, and withstand, empirical questioning which seeks to find out
what the facts are. Empirical questions are not matters of opinion and are not
answered by guessing. They can only be answered by checking to see what the
facts are. Emotions are a central part of our lives and they play a quite
legitimate role in our thinking. Intense emotions, however, “lead to poor
reasoning” (2002:12).
By asking a number
of questions and then seeking to answer them from ascertainable facts I will
indicate why I disagree with the statement
children ought to be produced for their own sake, not to satisfy our desires
and even suggest that the strength of the evidence against the statement suggests
that the statement commits what Joe Lau (2003:23) calls a fallacy of
insufficiency because any evidence in support of the statement would be
insufficient or weak in the face of the strong evolutionary and other evidence
I will put forward against the statement.
Some of the
questions I will ask are:
- What does it mean to produce
children “for their own sake”?
- Why do we produce children?
- Is it moral to have children?
The answers to
these questions will provide a number of “is” statements which I will use to
disprove the “ought” statement in the title of this essay. In doing this it
could be suggested that I am committing the naturalistic fallacy which claims
that the normative and descriptive spheres must remain separated, but with Tullberg
and Tullberg (2001:173) I will argue that the “is” of science is highly
relevant to the “ought” of ethics and agree with Barrett (1991:436) that “if we
feel that we must take Darwin really seriously, then we must realise that we
can only do this by showing how the naturalistic fallacy thesis should not be
taken seriously at all”.
2. The Naturalistic Fallacy Thesis (NF-thesis)
Acknowledging that
the NF-thesis is so popular that questioning it in a blunt manner may be
construed as a provocative or unfruitful exercise, Tullberg and Tullberg
(2001:165-174) nonetheless proceed to do so believing that simply because the
current opinion favours the NF-thesis does not make it right, or by default
provide it with immunity from deliberation. Judging by their references they
are not alone in questioning the validity of the NF-thesis. Pointing out that
Aristotle and Adam Smith formed their ethical ideas under strong influences
from observations of reality, they ask whether they blundered.
It is an aim of
ethics to discover what “are those properties belonging to all things which are
good” (2001:166), but far too many philosophers have thought that when they
named these other properties they were actually defining good. People like Hume
and Moore responded to this error which saw these properties not simply as ‘other’,
but rather as absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. The doctrine of
the naturalistic fallacy rapidly ceased to be a ban merely on defining good,
but rather it was taken as setting up two classes of expression leading to a
ban prohibiting any attempt to deduce an evaluative conclusion from premises
that are entirely non-evaluative. They ask whether this really is a strong
argument and ask whether anyone has actually said that “is” and “ought” are
synonymous. They then argue that while not synonymous they are not entirely
different and without connections and suggest that a dichotomy often creates an
illusory division, fundamentally non-existent, and give various supporting
examples. They identify the NF-thesis as having both strong and weak
interpretations. The strong interpretation being in the literal sense, and the
weak being one which allows for the inclusion of an ought premise which then
allows for an ought conclusion to be drawn. They regard both as invalid.
Ethical discussion
needs some bases and they suggest that in our time, when religion has lost much
weight we “are left with a void that has been partly filled with a semi-secular
altruistic philosophy that hangs in the air while the pillars of religion disintegrate”
(2001:171). Remembering how science and religion were kept apart, they recall
Francis Bacon's statement that moral philosophy is but a ‘handmaiden to
religion’ and suggest that this led to a similar conclusion, namely that
philosophy and science need to be kept apart. Science should stick to analysis
of the facts, means and affects - but what constitutes good and what should be
done are left to others. “The ground for these other decision-makers is
unclear, and the mystery of values prevails. The demarcation line has been set
and is seen as practical by many - even though the intellectual founding eroded
with the theory of evolution” (2001:172).
They convincingly
connect the split between science and philosophy with the Cartesian separation
of the soul from the body and point out that once man himself was accepted as a
natural product of the evolutionary process, the rest of the Cartesian
compromise could hardly be maintained. They suggest that the ongoing acceptance
of the NF-theory is that many academics believe in some kind of Cartesian
compromise even though neo-Darwinism rules such a possibility out. “Academia is
doing everyone a disservice by voluntarily disconnecting their “is” from the
“ought” of the discussion” (2001:173).
Using an illustration
from Tullberg and Tullberg I will justify the “is” statements I will be making
to disprove the “ought” statement in children
ought to be produced for their own sake, not to satisfy our desires. When a
doctor prescribes a treatment, we don't normally object that this practice
bridges the logical distinction between the facts of diagnosis and the value of
health. Biology, like medicine, has much to teach us about our species and the
risks we confront by ignoring the natural basis and consequences of our habits
of life.
With Tullberg and
Tullberg (2001: 173) I argue that a preoccupation with the naturalistic fallacy
makes us vulnerable to the real fallacy - the ideological fallacy: to think
that something exists because it is wished. When the “ought” is disconnected
from the profane “is” the road is opened for illusions of positive thinking.
That children
ought to be produced purely for their own sake is an example of an illusion of
positive thinking.
3. What does it mean to produce children “for their own sake”?
To produce
children for their own sake would mean having absolutely no ulterior motive. The motive would purely be for the sake of
producing offspring and populating the world. While some religious populations
might see this as a good goal to have and a good reason to produce children,
evolution by natural selection has rather favoured quality over quantity.
Nature reveals examples of offspring that are produced because of the parents’
desires. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (1999 : 333) records a study on Seychelles Warblers
which proves conclusively that these bird parents adjust sex ratios, producing
offspring of the sex most likely to enhance the family's situation, depending
on the circumstances prevailing when they hatch. “These birds clinched the case
that animals can custom tailor their families” and they do this precisely by
following their desires - producing 87% daughters, the sex most inclined to
stay and help out, in food rich areas (when help is needed), as opposed to only
23% daughters in food poor territories(when help is not needed). “Seychelles
warblers are adaptively configuring offspring sets in response to family
history and local conditions, just as surely as human parents do”(1999:333).
She goes on to
show how in well-studied monkeys, baboon and macaque species, daughters have
been shown to inherit rank from their mothers. Because daughters remain nearby,
it behoves a high-ranking mother to produce the sex that will benefit most from
her own status. High-ranking mothers do just this, they overproduce daughters.
On the other hand, low ranking females produce few daughters and more sons. The
reason for this has been shown to be that whereas as sons who depart their
natal group can leave the disadvantage of their mothers’ low rank behind,
daughters cannot (1999:334).
Animals do not
just produce children for their own sake, but rather to satisfy their desires.
One more example will suffice: it has been shown how a solitary mother fig wasp
who breeds alone ruthlessly manipulates her progeny (in accordance with her
desires) in ways that suit her long-term reproductive interests. She does not
produce children for their own sake, but rather, by fertilising the egg she
lays or not, determines the exact configuration of daughters and sons which she
can translate into the greatest number of grand-offspring. Out of a batch of
250 eggs one mother produced 235 daughters and just 22 sons.
Jerry Coyne
(2009:161) reminds us that “the currency of selection is not really survival
but successful reproduction.” I have already shown that successful reproduction
is not related to quantity (have children for their own sake) but quality (have
useful children, according to your
needs). “Natural selection never rests while vaccine elusive viruses such as
HIV/AIDS, avian influenza and herpes threaten the human population and other
infections keep up a constant attack on crops” (Quammen 2008:370), therefore,
we should, as natural selection has chosen over the years, have children
according to our desires and not just for their own sake. I suggest this so
that natural selection, which has brought our species to its current stage of
development, can continue its work unhindered. Without a doubt, natural
selection is busy developing a solution or ‘cure’ for AIDS, namely a human
species more resistant to the HI-virus.
Concluding this
section on what it means to have children “for their own sake” and how this is
the very antithesis to evolution by natural selection, it is important to
remember that “nature with its self organising systems of sexual reproduction,
biodiversity and natural selection, has been successfully evolving for 3.7
billion years. During that time, it has survived even the harshest
environmental catastrophes such as the annihilation of up to 96% of marine life
on earth. Humans on the other hand, began the process of crafting evolution to
suit their species soon after the end of the last ice age and then became
seriously proficient at it during only the last 200 years – that’s less than
100th of a second to midnight from the scale of earth history when
measured on a 24hour clock. Whatever approach we take, humility is key. In the
world of artificial selection, man’s survival will always at some level, be
dependent on nature. Conversely, in the world of natural selection, nature has
absolutely no need for man.” (Lloyd 2009:371).
It is into such a
world that children are born and it is now necessary to ask the question: why
do we have children? (Not, why should we
have children?)
4. Why do we have children?
Peter Singer
(2010:1) asks “Have you ever thought about whether to have a child? If so, what
factors entered into your decision? Was it whether having children would be
good for you, your partner and others close to the possible child, such as
children you may already have, or perhaps your parents? For most people
contemplating reproduction, those are the dominant questions.” Mary Lou Moore
(1983:126-128) in discussing the motivation for childbearing begins by saying
that pregnancy and the child may meet a need in the lives of the parents that
is not necessarily in the best interests of the child. She then presents a list
of reasons why people have children, some self explanatory and some which I
will discuss, but all certainly show that people do have children to satisfy
their own desires and that these desires are sometimes not good reasons for
having children. A person supporting the statement children ought to be produced for their own sake, not to satisfy our
desires would possibly use this list to suggest that the current reasons
why children are produced are so bad that they really should be produced purely
for their own sake.
- childbearing as a source of joy;
- childbearing as a manifestation of
the father and mother's love for each other;
- childbearing to create a loved and
loving family;
- childbearing as a bridge to the
future - children offer parents the chance to achieve a kind of
immortality;
- childbearing as a sacred duty;
- childbearing as a stepping stone
into the adult world - frequently adolescents and young adults see
pregnancy as an affirmation of their competency as adults;
- childbearing to save a
relationship;
- childbearing as a substitute for a
relationship;
- childbearing to please others;
- childbearing to produce an heir or
child of a specific sex;
- childbearing to replace a lost
child;
- childbearing as an escape -
pregnancy may be viewed as a means of escaping from undesirable
situations; for an adolescent this might be an unhappy home life while for
a more mature woman it might be to get out of a job;
- childbearing to fill a void;
- childbearing as therapy for
physiologic problems - perhaps as a cure for menstrual cramps, migraine
headaches or a variety of other ills. Here it is the pregnancy that is
desired, the child becomes a by-product;
- childbearing for the emotional
satisfaction of producing a perfect child;
- childbearing as an act of
rebellion or hostility.
Now several of the
above are definitely not good reasons
to have children and could, as I have said, be included on a list entitled “why
we ought not to produce children” but
I want to include one last example of a bad reason to produce children:
- childbearing for their own sake
and not to satisfy the desire's of the parents.
It comes across as
rather cold and clinical and suggests that the desires of the parents should
play no role in the decision to
produce children. But is this even possible? Is it possible to produce an
action without an underlying desire? Donald Hubin (2003:334) reminds us that “practical
reason is, as Hume maintained, the ‘slave of the passions’.” It is a tenet of
neo-Humeanism that it is desires (or Hume's ‘passions’) that generate reasons
for acting. Hubin acknowledges that while numerous objections have been
levelled against this view it should still be acknowledged that (and he
convincingly shows why) actions are grounded ultimately on subjective,
contingent, conative states of the agent and that these states are “typically,
if incautiously, called desires by
neo-Humeans” (2003:317).
Derek Reiners
(2001:152) in discussing the role of desires and emotions in decision-making
says that they “provide a link between evolved preference, strategies and
action” and that they enable people to commit to actions that are in their
long-term interest instead of trying to maximise utility in each individual
situation.
I suggest that all
the above is evidence that to produce children outside of the desires of the
parents, is not only not possible, but is wishful thinking.
So, why do we have
children?
5. Changes in demand for children and how they can be explained
Paul Turke (1989)
proposes an elaborate hypothesis regarding fertility transition - or, changes
in demand for children - informed by evolutionary theory. Noting the documented
large and enduring decline in fertility (what he calls the fertility transition)
and in completed family size that has occurred in society after society during
the course of modernisation, he supports the theory which argues that change in
human fertility occurs through change in three variables: supply of children,
demand for children, and costs of fertility regulation. He shows that although
we have evolved to maximise reproductive success (measured in quality offspring
rather than quantity) we have at the same time even in the most high fertility
societies, developed a relatively low rate of reproduction and this is ascribed
to the fact that in our evolving we have also become a species that relies
heavily on learned behaviour (1989:63). I would suggest, based on this, that we
have learned to not produce children
for their own sake. He then goes on to develop a hypothesis (which I would
suggest has at its very heart the satisfaction of the desires of parents) to
explain this evolutionary decrease in fertility which favours the production of
fewer, better nurtured offspring. His propositions can be summarised as follows
(1989:64-72):
- Resource insolvency brought on by
the birth of children has been an important selective pressure throughout
human evolution, and as a result humans have evolved to strive for social
and economic success.
- In traditional societies, extended
kinship networks function to disperse the costs of childrearing among an array
of relatives.
- The pursuit of social and economic
success in societies undergoing modernization leads to the breakdown of
these kinship networks. Simultaneously, there is a tremendous increase in
the complexity and number of routes to social and economic success (and
related fashions and luxuries).
- Following the breakdown of
extended kinship networks, childrearing costs are concentrated on parents,
thus potentially constraining the pursuit of social and economic success.
- Also following the breakdown of
extended kinship networks, resources formerly controlled by the kin group
(usually its elders) come under the control of young adults, enabling them
to concentrate resources on a small number of children. Once some parents
concentrate their resources on small numbers of children, other parents
must follow suit if their offspring are to be socially competitive.
It is clear in
each of these points how, evolutionarily speaking, the desires of parents are
very important in the production of children.
In another
explanation of decreasing fertility, Miller et al (2004:193) discuss the
motivation for childbearing and once again show the centrality of the parents’
desires in the process. They say that motivations are those broad psychological
forces that
impel individuals
toward some goal. In the case of fertility motivations, the goal is
childbearing and, like all motivations, they reside within the individual
actor. By its very nature, however, sexual reproduction requires the concerted
action of two individuals. This means that two separate motivational structures
must somehow be integrated if reproduction is to be achieved. When both members
of a reproductive
couple have
closely similar motivations, such integration is easily accomplished. However,
fertility motivations are psychologically complex and commonly vary across
reproductive partners both in terms of the strength of their different components
and in terms of their relationship to other (often competing) motivations. They
then present a framework which they call the Traits-Desires-Intentions-Behaviour
(TDIB) framework which describes the sequence by which motivational traits are
translated via conscious desires and intentions into behaviour. The
motivational traits which affect childbearing arise from a motivational
substrate that is based in nurturant schemas. Childbearing motivational traits
involve both the positive and negative feelings that are evoked by babies or
children and their care. The desires into which these traits are activated are
much more specific and decision-related, and include desires to have a child,
desires for a certain number of children, and desires about when to have a
child. These three categories of fertility desires all have their corresponding
intentions. The difference between desires and intentions is akin to
the difference
between what one would like to do given no situational constraints and what one
actually plans to do given the reality within which one ordinarily operates.
The last step in
the TDIB sequence is the implementation of intentions in the form of behaviour.
Thus childbearing desires and intentions may be described as the conscious
intermediaries between the schema-based motivational substrate for childbearing
and the instrumental behaviours that are designed to achieve or prevent
pregnancy.
It seems it is not
possible to produce children without the desires of the parents playing a
crucial role.
6. Is It Moral to Produce Children?
I would never have
thought of asking this question, but Peter Singer does in a recent New York Times article (Singer: 2010)
stating: “very few ask whether coming into existence is a good thing for the
child itself.” This takes the topic of this essay out of the realm of whether
we should have children for the sake of the children, or whether we should have
children to satisfy the desires of parents and places it in the realm of
whether it is moral to have children at all! Lainie Friedman Ross (1998:3)
states that, particularly in a liberal state, people have the freedom to “form
and raise a family according to their own conception of the good.” But outside
of the evolutionary reasons I've mentioned for producing children, is it good
to produce children? Is it good to add to the strain that nearly 7 000 000
000 people are already putting on our planet's environment? Is it good to
produce children for their own sake
or to satisfy the desires of their
parents into a globally warming environment which cannot sustain them and
their children indefinitely?
David Benatar
suggests and argues convincingly that children should not be produced for any reason whatsoever and in his own
words: “I am entirely serious in my arguments and I believe in the conclusions”
(2006:5). The following are among the claims Benatar defends in this book: It
is always wrong to have children; it would be better if pregnant women aborted
foetuses in the earlier stages of pregnancy; ideally, there should be no people
in the world; and, it would be better, all things being equal, if human
extinction happened sooner rather than later.
These claims are
straightforward implications of the central thesis for which Benatar argues:
Coming into existence is always a serious harm. Benatar summarises the thrust
of his argument as follows: “Although the good things in one’s life make it go
better than it otherwise would have gone, one could not have been deprived by
their absence if one had not existed. Those who never exist cannot be deprived.
However, by coming into existence one does suffer quite serious harms that
could not have befallen one had one not come into existence” (2006:1) He
presents a thesis which states that coming into existence can be a harm and then proceeds to a thesis that coming into
existence is always a harm..
Benatar proposes
anti-natalism, according to which it is wrong to have children. He maintains
that there is a pro-natal bias in society. He argues not only that there is no
duty to procreate but that there is to the contrary a moral duty not to
procreate. He says, however, that there is no conflict between this idea and
the widely recognised right to procreative freedom because the right to
procreative freedom is best understood as a legal rather than moral right. Benatar
contends that, once we accept the idea that early foetuses should be granted no
moral standing, we can see that the view that coming into existence is always a
harm entails the ‘pro-death’ view of abortion, according to which it would be
better to abort foetuses in the early stages of pregnancy. He says that it is
not abortion that requires justification, but rather failure to abort.
He applies his
view to the whole population and addresses related questions. How many people
should there be? His answer is zero because, again, coming into existence is
always a harm. Should future human extinction be regretted? His answer is
negative. He contends that extinction could be bad for those who experience its
final stages, but the state of human extinction itself is not bad. Would it be
worse if human extinction came sooner rather than later? His answer is, again,
negative. He argues that it would be better, all things being equal, if human
extinction happened sooner rather than later.
I like his thesis
on the basis that without saying it, he supports the evolutionary conclusion
that humans are not the most important goal of life on this planet and the
planet in fact will be far better off without humans. I do not however, agree
that coming into existence is always a serious harm. I include his ideas
because they eloquently address a view contrary to the one I take in this
essay.
A less eloquent
but more influential view, also contrary to mine, comes from Steve Watters, Focus
on the Family’s Director of Young Adults, who says: "While it's trendy to
talk about curbing baby emissions, most industrialized countries actually need
more population: more babies to sustain and care for their aging population.
It's a general misread of demographics across the world to see it as a baby
problem. But most importantly, the world needs to see Christians leading lives
of fruitfulness. That's fruitfulness across the board — biological fruitfulness
in marriage, but also lives of fruitfulness where we're showing generosity in
care for the elderly and our concern about social problems, but not trying to
solve them by adopting trendy practices of birth control.” (Watters 2010).
7. Conclusion
Carol Levine
(1990:34) reminds us that “families are no longer primarily centres of
production and procreation; they have become instead centres of emotional and
social support. Procreation is separated from sexual behaviour and is an active
choice rather than necessity.”
In this essay I
have argued against the idea that children ought to be produced for their own
sake and not to satisfy our desires.
I have shown that
the facts of evolution by natural selection indicate that the human species has
in fact evolved in such a way as to make desires an essential part of
decision-making and that natural selection favours species that produce
offspring in order to satisfy their desires rather than species that produce
offspring purely for their own sake.
I suggest that it
is illogical to suggest a practice (the producing of children for their own
sake and not to satisfy our desires) which is the very opposite of the practice
(producing children to satisfy our own desires) that has allowed us to evolve
to the point where we can debate this issue.
8. List of References
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York
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Blaffer.1999. Mother Nature: Maternal Instincts and How They Shape The Human
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Moore, Mary Lou.
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Be the Last Generation? in New York Times
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